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In the Supreme Court
of tlte State of Utah

LEHI IRRIGATION

C0~1PANY,

Plaintiff ·and App,ellamt,

vs.

Case No.

CLARENCE T. JONES and ED H.
WATSON, State Engineer of the State
of Utah,
Defendants and Responwernts.

7189

REPLY OF RESPONDENT JONES TO AMICUS
CURIAE BRIEF

STATEMENT
While it may be doubted that the matters interjected
by A'I'I'J;icus Curiae are properly so brought into this case,
we have asked and have been permitted by the court, to
file a reply to the brief so filed. The State Engineer will
file a separate reply brief.
e will cite pages fron1 the Record with the letter
"'T~ "~ pages from th0 Transcript of Evidence 'vith the

'V
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letter '' T' ', pages from A mieurs Curia.e brief with the
letter "A", and pages from our first brief with the letter

"0".
A brief statement of facts may be of some help to the
court. The location of natural streams and of cities may~
of course, be judicially noticed. As may be gleaned from
the R.ecord, the general area irrigated since 1913 through
the Provo Reservoir Canal extends from the upper Provo
River northwesterly and above the cities and towns of
Provo, Orem, Pleasant Grove, American Fork, and Lehi,
and thence into Salt Lake County through the·Narro·ws,
where it is syphoned under the Jordan River.
The lands of the respondent Jones are adjacent to
Dry Creek, 3 or 4 miles North and East of Lehi. As recited in our first brief, the waters involved are naturally
used and reused after leaving the Provo River, before
reaching the lands of this respondent. His upper lands
have been irrigated for many years, and since 1913 son1e
of the water used thereon has con1e fron1 the Provo R.eservoir Canal. The seepage or spring water arises in his
ovvn lands, and, the Record shovvs, 1nainly fron1 his 0"\\7ll
irrigation on his upper land. This is indicated by his
testin1ony as to the affect of his irrigation up there on
the different springs.
A good picture can be obtained as to· tl1e springs an<l
spring areas, and the uses of the \Vater conten1plated by
the applications, if referene is n1ade to his testin1on)·
(T. 10-29) and to the blue prints (Exhibits 1 and 2). fii~
t-estin1ony is corroborated, but not disputed, except as to
the Sn1ith spring, \vhich is above the f~hnith ditch, and i~
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sho"·n in the h)\Yer right hand corner of Exhibit 2.
\Yhether there can be any appropriation of this sp~ring,
or any of them, for that matter, "·ill be up to the State
Engineer, and 'vill depend upon· the final proof and final
determination.
Ca:)e 1-iG-±5~ .A. pplication 17805, inYolve8 one spring,
Xo. 12, Ex. 1. The use fron1 this spring i~ for culinary and
doinestic purposes, and to a small extent for irrigation.
The spring supplies 4 substantial strings of chicken coops
and 2 residences with s1nall la\\·ns and a garden, and
irrigation of about .9 acre of additional land. The total
area covered by all these is between two and three acres,
and, of course, all the water from the coops and homes
without diminution, flows directly to Dry Creek, and the
irrigated portions drain thereto. This spring water has
been put to similar uses there since sometime in 1890, increased since 1913 by Provo Reservoir Canal and doubled
s~nce 1944 ])eer Creek irrigation.
Case 14646, Application 17806, Exhibit 2, covers
small springs sho,Yn as }7"o. 1, No. 7, No. 8, and No. 9.
These are on the North side of the Creek, and arise on and
are to be used for irrigation of about · 3.24 acres
of land from 'vhich the vvater drains into Dry Creek.
These seeps, unless the water is so diverted therefront
Rnd used for irrigation, could only form small and useless mar~hes v1ithout any additional drainage reaching
the Creek.
Casp 14647, Ap]Jlicati.on 17807, covers springs and
~pring areas shown as No. 2 to No. 6, and No. 10 and No.
11 in Exhihit 2. These are located on the South side of
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the Creek, immediately below the springs covered by the
previous application. They substantially all drain into
the spring area shown as No. 10, the pasture.
This respondent testified that this whole spring area
is rnarshy, so that it cannot be used now for pasture because the cows mire down, and it has got to be drained
( R. 23). There is other testimony that hunters could not
walk or ride a horse across it because of this condition.
It is proposed to drain this into the fish pond, as shown
on Exhibit 2. This use is non-consumptive, and could not
diminish the return flow.
It would seem that the beneficial use contemplated
hy this application would not diminish the return- flow.
On the other hand, it would appear that if the applicant
cannot apply the waters to a beneficial use, as contenlplated, that his property would be substantially damaged
and portions thereof rendered useless to him.
If appellant, or the Provo Reservoir Company, have
any prior rights or clear appropriations that may be affected here, it n1ay be assumed that these rights will ·be
considerd by the State Engineer in making a final determination as to what, if any, "\Vaters 1nay be appropriated and beneficially used under these applications,
without interference with other rights. And, in any event,
it is certain that the n1ere approval of these applications
does not affect any such rights, and, under the statute,
the approval must be subject to prior right, and by its
express term, it is subject to ~~uch rights.
Under the Record here, there would certainly seen1
to be some water in these springs 'vhich respondent n1ay
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beneficially use, and which neither the appellant under
its alleged diligence rig-ht or a rnicus c:uriae under the
eber filings or 1943 diversion could claim. This is so,
even if \Ye assumed all that they both say as correct.
.A.pproval of the applications by the State cannot
result in giving respondent anything that he cannot ultimately acquire, 'vithout interference with prior rights.
This approYal merely leaves the matter open for deternlination of the amount of water he thus 1nay acquire a
right to use.
On the other hand, their rejection would leave him
helpless to protect and beneficially use. this, or even protect and use his own property. Certainly, neither of these
objecting parties can appropriate his property .for swamp.
storage of their water,_ if any they have here.
In our first brief, we supported by direct authorities,
three propositions. These were:
1. That the issue raised on appeal as to Government
filings on the Weber River could not, without any pleadings below, be raised for the first time on argument here.
2. That the objection based on possible claims by a
third party stranger to -the action, is not aYailable to
appellant here.
3. That on the merits, appellant's claims, whether
arising under this or under its diligent creek right, as
pleaded, did not justify rejection of these applications.

''r

Amicus Curiae supports our statement that the

issue was not raised b~:- the pleadings below, and appellant
1nakes no reply and no contention that it \Vas. On the
claim that was pleaded by it belo,v, Arn'icus Curiae 8ays
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that it is ' ' conceded by appellant' ' that the waters
claimed have not been appropriated by it (A. 4); that
it was established that appellant had no right (A. 5); and
refers to it later as ''a defeated litigant'' (A. 7).
Our second point, as briefed and supported, is not
contested at all, and the authorities cited (0. 8-12) are
not challenged. These seem to entitle respondent to an
affirmance of the judgment here.
The third point, on the merits as it relates to the
appellant having no right to object to the approvals under
its claim, as pleaded, is not questioned by it, and is endorsed and enforced by ~amicus curiae.
The point argued that it is conclusive that there is
no unappropriated water, and the court must now peremptorily reject these applications, \vill be discussed
later.
Because of quite numerous repetitions in the an~i.cus
ruriae brief, we will attempt to short.en this brief by
numbering son1e contentions n1ade therein, \vhich appear
to us to be fundan1en tally erroneous, and will discuss
these under each nun1ber in order. \Ve will avoid extended
discussion of the points so clearly n1ade and supported
in the inforn1ative and excellent brief filed by the State
Engineer. vVe cannot cite this brief as printed, as it is
not yet out.
So1ne main points of confusion and error by an~icus
curiae are on the "following 111a tters :
1. As to amicus curiae injecting his eli en t as a
party.
2. ..._t\.s to the nature and affect of the State En-
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gineer 's proceedings.
3. ....-\..s to the effect of the decision there or here, as
it relates to claims of parties, or as asserted by ~amicus
curz.ae.
±. ..._\.s to what constitutes appropriation, or what
is unappropriated 'Yater. Record shows no prior appropriation of waters is involved.
5. ..A. s to w·hat the court may here judicially notice.
6. The affect of injecting application No. 12'144,
as defeating previous contentions, and error in comment
as to cases cited.
BRIEF AND ARGUMENT
I
That Provo River Water Users cannot become a
party by appearan~ of its attorney Amicus Cur~ae seems
clear. A.m·icus Curiae cannot, by statement that an outside party asserts rights in the subject of litigation, make
it a party. Appearance Amicus Curiae is not an appearance for a party at all. It is merely as a friend of the
court.

. 2 A1n. Jur. pg. 679, Sec. 4. "RIG·H·TS AND
POWERS OF AMICUS CURIAE-IN GENERAL.- As stated above, an amicus curiae is
heard only by leave and for the assistance of the
court upon a case already before it. He has no
control over the. suit and no right to institute any
proceedings therein. It seen1s clear that an amicus
curiae cannot assu1ne the function of a party in
an action or proceeding pending before the court,
and that ordinarily, he cannot file a pleading in a
cause . .J._t\n a1nicus curiae is restricted to suggestions relative to Inatters apparent ·on the record
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or to matters of practice. His principal function
is to aid the court on questions of la:w.

*.

*
:1:
The appearance of an attorney as amicus
curiae is not an appearance for a party, although
he may be the regularly retained attorney of the
party.''
See also:
Beall v. Beall (Ore.) 128 P. 835 at 837
2 C.J. pg. 1325
If it were to become a party, it is equally clear that
it would have to do so by proper appearance and intervention, and upon pleadings setting forth its claim. It
cannot app.ear without pleadings or evidence to support
its claim, and attempt to assert rights by mere statement
of what it claims they are, and thus defeat the rights or
claims of an actual party litigant. It would, obviously,
have to be in the case in such a way that if its asserted
claims could be adjudicated against it, it would be bound
by such action. It could not, thus, offhand, defeat the
clain1s of a party litigant without that party having the
opportunity, by due process, to contest its claims. Other'vise, there 'vould be no order in eourt procedure and no
end to litigation, because any nu1nher of people could
con1e in and a~.sert clain1s taking up time of the court,
and 'vhich, jf they 'vere properly presented and tried
out, n1ay be found not to exist.
The issue atte1npted to he raised, is the right of
the vVater users Association to the \Yater fronl thr·
~prings on respondent's property. This is a conflicting
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right to that attempted to be initiated by the applications.
The statement of alniC'us curia.e (A. 5) that this issue
1i1ay be here raised by his client is obviously incorrect.
This court has also repeatedly held that the issue of such
conflicting w·ater rights cannot be determined at all by
the State Engineer on such applications, or by the Court
on appeal proceedings. (See Engineers Reply Brief.)
Eardley r. Terry, 94 Utah 367, 77 P. (2) 362 at 366:
··It should silnpl~- be determined whether the
application 'vas rightly rejected. In determining
that question, the court stands in the same position as the Engineer. It must determine from the
evidence whether there is probable cause to believe that there is unappropriated water available,
or 'vater 'vhich can be made available, for use.''·
In this connection, it also appears that neither amicus
curiae, nor his client, can properly assume to assert and
represent the "Public Interest" claimed to be here inYolYed. "\Vaters of this State do belong to the puiblic. The
achninistration thereof, however, is exclusively with the
State of Utah, and is by· it enjoined upon its State Engineer. He is specifically charged with the duty of preventing ''Taste and promoting greatest beneficial use.
This is the policy of the State.
100-1-3 U.C.A. 1943:

''Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure, and the limit of all rights to the use of water
in this State."
Little Cottonwood v. K·irnball, 289 P. 116, at 117 and

''In the arid region, "\Vater is precious, and it

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
is the undoubted policy of the law to prevent its
waste and promote its largest beneficial use."
****
''The waste of water in arid regions is an
evil that should be condemned. vV ater is a 'precious fluid'; water is the 'life of the desert'. But
precious to whom~ Precious to the farmer who
uses it to make the earth give forth her bounties;
fully as precious to him as to any other me1nher
of the community."

II
The brief erroneously assumes that the approval of
these applications, "subject to prior rights", will have
some far reaching or destructive effect upon the 'vhole
plan of reclamation in the State. That water rights are
thereby adjudicated or concluded.
We cannot add to the refutation of this assun1ption
in the State's reply brief. Certainly, rights of persons
not appearing in such proceeding are not touched thereby.
Little Cottonwood v. Kintball, 289 P. 116, 118:
"The approval of an ~-pplication to appropriate is only a preliminary step. It confers upon
the applicant no perfected right to the use of
water. It does not in any degree impair or diminish
the existing rights of others.''

1 anner v. Bacon, 136 P. (2) 957, 967:
7

''No conclusion, finding or action of the Engineer in approving or rejecting an application to
appropriate "Tater is final or binding upon any
party \vho n1a:~ feel aggrieved thereby, except a~
to the right of the applicant to have his appliration filed, and thereb~· fix the time of his priority,
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if he proeeeds and eon1pletes or perfects an appropriation.''

III
The brief states ( ~\.. 7), and repeats, that. if these
applications are not here rejected by the court, the Provo
River ''Tater Users ..c\.ssociation will ~~be substantially
and adversely affected.'' Th~se assertions are wholly
unsupported, and appear to be entirely erroneous.
~\.s

pointed out In the State's brief, not only are the
rights recited by auz icus curiae unaffected by the Engineer's approval, but this is a private suit by one protestant and appellant claiming it would be aggrieved by
the appropriations sought. Nobody but the parties hereto is, or· can be, affected by this law suit, and it must be
r~ecided upon the clain1s and Record n1ade by the parties
hereto.
~\s quoted from W eil in our first brief ( 0. 10), he
says:
"'It is too obvious to require elaboration that
the parties to a la'Y suit must fight it out between theinselYes, and, at the same tin1e, its re·
sults affect the1n alone."
It 'vould be an affront to the court for us to here cite
authority that persons who are not parties to a suit
can be affected in any way by the judgment therein.

IV
The brief appears to be entirely· in error as to what
con~titutes an appropriation or what is appropriated
\Vater. It repeatedly asserts that all the waters involved
have heert appropriated by the United States, by the
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Weber River filings, and that it "is the property of the
:Provo River vVater Users Association.'' On this contention, it apparently seeks to support the suggestion of
the appellant, although it never contended that all the
'vater involved came from the Weber, but sought to show,
and did show, that some of it did not (T. 73). It is not
true, by the Record, that all the waters sought to be appropriated by Jones have accrued to his springs from
\Veber River diversions. The testimony does indicate that
about one-half the present flow has resulted fron1 irrigation from the Deer Creek Project. But as above show·n
(T. 73), not all Deer Creek water comes from the \-Veber.
And, as stated above, the water of these springs has re~ulted from irrigation on higher land, back to and prior
to 1913.
It "~as found that the storage in Deer Creek was of
\Vaters '• substantially all from the \~Veber River," but
not all. So, it is neither shown nor found that the higher
irrigation is all fron1 waters that can1e from the vVeber.
This fact alone requires affirn1ance here, even if
other clain1s \vere conceded, because if there is any w·ater
available, or "rhich n1ay become available, the Engineer's
approval 1nust stand (see our first brief 0.-4, and the
State's brief). And the assertion (.Lt\.. 7) that only legal
consequences of ''undisputed facts is presented,'' is erroneous.
But, independentl~r of these, the brief of the State
l~~ngineer herp conclusively shows that none of the \Vater~
ela i1ned to ha Ye been previously appropriated h;: filing:~
on \Veher River "·ere thus or at all appropriated. Tll0
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rases here cited establish, and it is undoubtedly the
la"·· that the 1nere filing· of an application is not, and
1nay neYer result in, an appropriation. This brief also
establishe~ that the duty of the State Engineer, as enjoined upon hhn by this court, "·as properly discharged
here, and his disc.retion appropriately exercised.
~\s is pointed out by ,,. . eil on vVater Rights, 3rd Ed.,
Sec. 289 (8), unappropriated \Yaters n1ay be any waters
'vhich, for the tin1e. are not being put to a beneficial use,
and appropriation is not accon1plished by filing an application. He ~ays, ":-ith reference to the use of the word
in this connection, that it is sometimes used
•'as denoting the first step in acquiring a right.
· ~-\ppropriation is a n1uch abused 'vord; it is often
loosely spoken of as the prelin1inary step-such
as filing a notice? Inaking a claim to the "\Vater, or
the like', """hich 1s a 'vholly improper use of the
"-ord.' ·
In our first brief \Ve cited lTtah cases (0. 9) that
appropriation is the actual application of the \Vater to a
heneficial use. These \Ya ters clearly are not being so
applied hy any objector here.
\\:r e call attention no"- to some additional matters in
this connection . ...-\s "-e have already pointed out, this
third party clain1 is not in issue, and is not presented,
and is not before the court on this appeal. In this case,
"·e had onl~. to meet the claim, as alleged, of appellant's
(li]i_g-ence right. The trial court harl onl~.,. to determine
\\·h0thrr tl1at clain1 required the Engineer to reject the
appl1eation. The Record ""as made on this basis. \Ve could
not havr made a Recor(l "-hich n1ight cover an~'" snggeR-
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tion ~y a stranger in the court here on appeal.
We have also pointed out, and the State's brief has
established, that claims such as are now suggested, involving the determination of: quieting of title to water
rights, could not have been involved or settled in an ac~
tion of this character, to review the discretion of the
State Engineer.
We also point out that this third party claim was
never suggested until after the pleadings were settled,
all evidence introduced, arguments made, and the case
decided (T. 113). When it was suggested, or attempted,
by the offer of the applications to appropriate Weber
water, one· objection was that these were not material
to the issue pleaded CT. 117). Whether this was the sole
ground of rejection, or not, we do not know. The court,
.however, indicated that it thou~ht this ground was well
taken (T. 118-119). This ruling, rejecting these applica~
tions, is not challenged· here. The applications are not in
evidence.
· As further indicating the great number of questions
that 1nay be raised if the court vvere to attempt to litigate the alleged claims, as suggested by amicus cur,iae,
as this is elaborated in the State Engineer's brief, we
call the court's attention. to the fact that these are percolating underground waters. If respondent's water from
his higher lands had been permitted merely to run on the
surface down to this lower ground, that would present,
the mere question of reuse by a user. As we suggested in
our first brief., that is possibly the· only claim to the·
right of reuse that could ever be involved here. However,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

as to percolating '\Vaters, the question of identity beco1nes
inYnlYed, in addition to the question of return and mingling "Tith other sources of supply. And, the decisions of
this r.ourt have thus far indicated that no one, except the
(nvner of the land 'vhere pereolating "·ater arises, can
establish a clahn thereto, as long as it is not allowed to
eseape fron1 his land ( 0. 5).
There 'vould also be the issue as to '\vhether these
seep~ result fron1 son1e escape water of prior claimant,
as suggested by the State Engineer. And necessity of exploring the 'vhole field of ~ ''Ya ters from foreign sources''
(See\\' eil, \""" ol. 1 p. 60).
In vie\\- of "-hat has been said, it would seem to be
unnecessary to enter into a technical argument with
reference to the contention of amicus r:uri.ae on the mention of ~'unappropriated waters on our statute.'' A pparently, in ans\\'er to our brief ( 0. 4) citing the deeisions
of this court that it is the duty of the State Engineer to
grant the application if there "is or may be" water
available for appropriation, or "if there is probable
cause to believe there is unappropriated waters . . .
,,·hich can be made available for use,'' a somewhat inlpassioned argument is made (A. 10). It is to the effect
that "if it is brought to the attention of the State Engineer or the court at one or another stage of the proceeding that any of the water involved is not unap·propriated," then the application n1ust be arbitrarily rejected at the threshold. That this is not the interpretation given to our statutes by this court, is established by
he State':--: brief here. It i~ arguPcl that an affir1native
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showing must be made before the State Engineer that
there is no unappropriated water, or, otherwise, if there
were no protest, the Engineer must allow any application.
Of course, the showing that was made to the State Engineer is not before the court, and the statute also authorizes and requires an investigation by the State Engineer
himself upon the ground.
Coming now to the statutes (A. 10), the use of "unappropriated" in the Title to 100-3-2, and the statement
that in order" to acquire the right to the use of unappropriated public water, an application must be filed," in no
way indicates that this question must be immediately
and finally adjudicated. ·This is in connection with the
preceding Sec. 1 that rights to use can now be acquired
only by filing with the State Engineer. Then, Sec. 2
silnply indicates this filing as the first step in acquiring use of unappropriated waters, and says this should
he taken ''before commencing'' the construction of distributing ''rork~, or of \York tendjng ·to acquire such
rights. Tl~cn, the other s~ep~ are set forth in ~uccecclinc
I

section~.

Then, coming to Sec. 8, dealing vvith matters to be
considered by the State Engineer, the language is quoted:
' 'If an application does not meet the requirements of this section, it should be rejected.''
There are a nu1nber of things set forth here, including the
payment of fees, etc., including a reference to 100-2-1-±,
'vhich, under certain circumstances, i1nposes upon the applicant, the pay1nent of the expenses of an exan1ination
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and an investigation of the physical situation by the
8tate Engineer. This is in1n1ediately followed by the
language quoted. It does not appear to apply to the question of unappropriated w·aters, \Yhich is a n1atter for
the State Engineer's investigation and is not a matter
\vhich is under the control of the applicant, so that he
could n1a.ke his application ~'comply''.
It is clear, fron1 the cases cited in our first brief and
in the State· s brief, that there is no such eon1pulsion by
reason of this language, as is contended.
We must disagree, also, with the rule of interpretation (A. 11) to the effect that the Legislature, by repealing in 1939 the language in Sec. 8 that ''where there is no
unappropriated \Vater in the proposed source of suppl)',
it shall be the duty of the State Engineer to reject such
application,'' intended the language of that repealed provision to remain in effect. The rule of construction, as
\\~e understood it is exactly to the contrary.
Another matter of misconception in this connection
is the reference to the language in the quoted statutes
(A. 10) as to "unappropriated \Vater in the proposed
source." Fro1n this; it is argued that the "proposed
~onrce" here is \\. . eber River. Each of these applications
recites, in paragraph 6, that the "source of ~upply" is
''unnamed springs'' or ''spring areas.'' The trial court
specifically found (R. 36) that "the waters involved ...
::1re \Vaters arising fron1 springs and spring areas upon
the lands of said defendant, and are sought to be appll (•d to beneficial use upon his said land.'' It certainly
appear~ that at lea~t son1c of this \Vater from these
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sources, if not all of it, is unappropriated.
And so, the repeated statement that the respondent
ha~ established that he has no right is incorrect, as is
al~o the statement that anyone can raise the matter by
~i1nply calling it to the attention of the court. They are
attempting here to insert an allegedly adverse and prior
right by merely asserting it in the brief. The illustration used (A. 6), by reference to a "quiet title" suit on
the Walker Bank Building, would be more nearly in
point if we were in an action to quiet title, and also, if in
ciUCh suj t, the bank building had been erected on land
owned by one of the parties.

v
In viev\r of what has been briefed, the question of
what may be judicially noticed here is, perhaps, a matter
of interest, rather than of any great importance.
\Ve questioned ( 0. 2) the suggestion made in appel
Ian t 's brief that the court could so notice Deer Creek and
·'the details with respect thereto.'' However, in discussing appellant's lack of interest in any such matters, we
traced the course of· water fron1 Weber River according
to our kno,vledg-e. Now, the an~icus curiae brief says
(A. 9):
"It is our OJJ:.ni.on ... deer creek ... its
scope ... and plan ... is judicially known.'~

It goes then into great length and detail of facts, and of
the Gvvernment's intentions, and other applications not
in the Record (A. 27), and says (A. 28):
"A~ a result of all this, '"'"e believe the project
is kno-vvn to this court.''
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Again, no authority is rited. The burden of having this
court consider all the 1natters ~o presented is upon the
party rlaiming the right to such consideration. It is quite
elear that the court nuly not take jndieial kn<nYledg·e of
these, or of "·hat it n1a~· kno"··
21 ~\.n1. J ur. p. 52 :

· · Section 21. Judicial, a~ Distinguished fro1n
~\.c.tual, Kno,vledge.-J udicial notice in any particular casp is not detern1ined or limited by the
actual kno,vledge of the individual judge or rourt.
There is a basic distinction between judicial notice and judicial kno,vledge .... ''
104-46-1 l-r.c.A. 1943 recites what facts the court may

take notice of. Frorr1 this, it would appear that nothing
that is recited here 1na~T be noticed, except the geography
that is involved. From other statutes, however, and from
interpretations in the general law, it appears that such
geography may be considered; also, the existence of cities
and towns, and the location of natural and important
rivers and lakes (See 20 Am. J ur. p. 74, 77, 79).
Bacon v. Plain City Irrig,at~on Company, 52 P. (2)
427. In this case, the court held that even where there
had been a deter1nination by the State Engineer in· a
general adjudication proceeding under the statute, and
he had filed this as a proposed decree under the statute
in the said proceeding, that in another case, arising out
of this determination, neither the trial judge in the
san1e court \vhere that proceeding 'vas pending, nor the
Snpretne Court on appeal, could take judicial notice of

it.
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The decision is reflected in the second syllabus, as
follow::;:
''Neither trial court nor reviewing court
could take judicial notice of proposed determination of water rights filed by state engineer with
clerk of court. where document was not made part
of the pleadings in action on assessments levied
against irrigation company (JJaws 1925, c. 100)."
This would appear to eliminate any filings here in
other ptoceedings, or any adjucations on any such fil.
ings, or any determinations of the State Engineer with
relations thereto.
The general law on this subject, and as reflected by
other decision8 of this. court, such as 76 Utah 243, 267;
289 I~ . 116, seen1s to be well reflected in the following
quotations:
"It was squarely held in Robison v. Kelly, 69
. Utah 376, 2·55 P. 430, that the court cannot take
·judicial knowledge of ·its own records in another
and different case.''

20 An1. J ur. _p. 4_6:
''Secti0n 16. GENERALLY.-It is a wellintrenched part oi the judicial system that the
judge sees only with judicial eyes and knows nothing respecting any particular ·case of which he is
not informed judicially.''
~0

Am. Jur. p. 48:
... ,., Generally. speaking, n1atters of judicial
notice ·have three material requisites: (1) The
rnatter must be a n1attet -of common and general
knowledge; ( 2) it Inust be well and authoritatively
settled and not doubtful and uncertain; ( :1) and it
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n1ust be kno\Yn to be \Yithin the lin1its of the jurisdiction of the court.''
:?0

~un.

J ur. p. 49 :
''Section 18. 11ATTERS OF CO·MMON
KXO,VLEDGE.-The n1atter of \Yhich a court will
take judicial notice must be subject of common
and general kno\\·ledge. In other words, judicial
lmo,vledge of facts is measured by general knowledge of the san1e facts .... ''

:::0 Am. Jur. p. 51:
~·Section

20. EXTENT OF CO·MMON
KXO,\TLEDGE.-Jlldicial notice is based upon
the obvious reason of convention and expediency,
for it operates to save the time, trouble, and expense vvhich would be lost in establishing in the
7
ordinar'
'vav
.
•' facts '' hich do not admit of contradicIon
t . ..... "
\~I

Under this, we will try to throw some light generally
on other matters discussed in the last 20 pages of the
brief.
These are devoted to a somewhat enlarged and fancifully elaborated picture of reclamation achievements and
Government intentions, to some propaganda apparently
to influence the court to believe that everybody is interested in and excited about what \Ve propose doing
writh some little springs on about 8 or 10 acres of land,
in advising and warning the court as to its future policies,
and to considerable caustic comment on our unfortunate
ignoranee of irrigation n1atters and irrigation law.
This last is a little disconcerting to a couple of old
~hovel pushing irrigators.
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w.e are sure, also, that there is no great or universal
concern or interest in the outcome here, and that no
public calamity is likely to result.
Somewhat bitter comment is made on our stateInents: (1) that the filings on the Weber River, if in evidence, contain ''no intimation of purpose to recapture,
and there is before the court no intimation of this," and
(2) that it "can't be assumed as probable" that the
Reclan1ation · Department will attempt to repasses the
water involved.
The first statement is merely a correct statement of
fact. The second statement of probability is made in
relation to the language used by this court as to the duty
to grant an application, if there is reasonable probability
that water may be made available. These are called assumptions on our part, and then it is confidently asserted
that the United States does intend· to reclaim this
seepage,· apparently directly. And, if this is true, then,
of course, to reclaim it on the lands of every farmer
where seepage 1nay appear from increased irrigation.
lt is stated that we cannot help our case by "arguInent and conjecture," and yet, it seems clear to us that
these are exactly what the writer of the -amicus curia•e
brief is using throughout. He then introduces an argunlent 'vhich defeats about all that he has contended previously.
It vvas theretofore repeatedly argued that by reason
of the filings on the Weber River, all the \Vater con1ing
frorn Deer Creek \vas thereby already appropriated. That
hy rea~on thereof, all the 'vater arising fron1 inereaRecl
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Irrigation therefron1, including the water here involved,
and any other draining toward Utah Lake had been thus
appropriated.
Xo"y' he interjeets filing No. 12144 (A. 27), which
is a governn1ent filing on Utah Lake, based on withholding 30,000 acre feet in Deer Creek "·in lieu of certain
seepage return flo'Y and/or other waters belonging to the
United States which will flow into and augment the
"-ater supply of lTtah Lake as a result of the construction and operation of Deer Creek R.eservoir'' (A. 32).
This is an acknovvledgement that such waters are under
the jurisdiction of the State Engineer.
And of course, the Government must have considered
its filing Xo. 12144 to be on unappropriated water, and
on "-ater, according to the previous argument as to the
statutes (_. ~.
. 10), which the Engineer must have found
were unappropriated vvaters before approving this application. Then, if these waters were unappropriated and
subject to this lovver filing by the Government itself, how
can anticus curiae, speaking here for the Government,
contend as against us that the san1e vvaters vvere already
appropriated by the Weber River filing. The G-overnment's actions do not conform with the assertions of its
spokesman.
FurthermorP, it thus becomes apparent that it is not
the intention of the Government to go in and clain1, and
thus prevent the use of seeps on farms over the system,
btt.t is rather the intention that these be generally put
tf) heneficial use by the farn1ers, Vv.. hich is a high public
use, and allo,ved then to flow into the Lake as the ulti-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

24

mate drainage from the whole project. This would, at
least, seem "probable".
While the brief cites no new authority, as we have
above indicated, it does refer to two Federal cases, the
Ide case and the Raga case, already cited by both parties
to the action. We are somewhat belabored because of our
claim that these cases are not of the sam·e character as
the one here presented, and for mentioning some other
distinguishing features in our brief. Yet, both of those
cases were cases directly on and involving the determinaation; and quieting title to, water rights. And, if it did
not already appear from the cases cited in our first
brief, it certainly appears from the briefs here now that
this case does not and cannot involve any such determination or adjudication.
So far as we can see, every other distinguishing
feature mentioned by us was correctly stated, and in
view of the nature of this action, the co1nment (A. 19-20)
is out of bounds, to say the least, and the statement (A.
21) that the Ide ease is not distinguishable "unless it be
ground of distinction that the Shoshone Project was constructed in Wyoming and the Provo River Project in
Utah . . . that seepage water from Shoshone Project
arose in a ravine and from the Provo Project in a
spring,'' is absurd.
CONCLUSION
It appears to us that the amicus curz.a.e brief can
hring in no ne1v parties or any new or additional issues.
That it adds n~thing by 'vay of support to the only clain1
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of the appellant, \vhich is pleaded and in issue, but, on
the other hand, asserts that ap·pellant has no right under
this ~laim.
That ,,. . eber River filings are not before the court,
and are not in issue under the pleadings. That if they
\vere in evidence and in issue, they would not constitute an appropriation of any \Vaters whatsoever. That
there is no\v here no claim of prior appropriations contended for.
That, as to the seepage waters involved, it is probable that at least some of these are subject to approp·riation and beneficial use, and that this is a matter of final
investigation and determination by the State Engineer.
That, in approving the said applications, he has not
abused his discretion, but has proceeded properly in the
premises.
Respectfully submitted,

MULLINER, PRINCE & MULLINER
Attorneys for Resp,ondent
Clarence T. Jones
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